In this technical appendix, we detail the solutions to the production and the capacity games without imposing Assumptions A-1 and A-2. Further, we formally show the existence of equilibrium in the capacity game for all three subgames and prove that the symmetric equilibrium in the choice of capacity is unique for the pure flexible and the pure dedicated subgames. We formally show the nonnegativity of ex-post prices in the pure flexible subgame. 1 Finally, we obtain analytical conditions under which Assumptions A-1 and A-2 hold.
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We recall that the price for product y is P y (Q y , Q 3−y ) = A y − Q y − βQ 3−y . Profit expressions for the production game can be calculated as follows:
b
where x = f, d, m depending on the subgame in which the firm operates (flexible, dedicated or mixed).
The designationˆdenotes the optimal values of profits/decision variables. Bold letters denote vectors.
All vectors are column vectors, and the superscript T denotes the transpose. For example, A T represents the vector (A 1 , A 2 ). All vectors are compared component-wise.
The flexible subgame
Suppose both firms invest in flexible technology that can produce both products and consider the last stage of the game (the production game). Assume without loss of generality that firm j has higher 1 The nonnegativity of prices is shown in the pure flexible subgame for illustrative purposes only. Proofs for the other subgames are along similar lines. capacity than firm i, i.e., that the outcome of the capacity game is such that K f fi ≤ K f fj . Given these capacities and a vector of demand intercept realizations A T , firms decide upon production quantities.
The decision for one firm in isolation has been obtained by Chod and Rudi (2005) . For two firms, the last-stage optimization problem can be formulated using Lagrange multipliers as follows:
Combinations of the Lagrange multipliers and the slack variables give rise to 9 different optimization problems. It is convenient to represent the possible outcomes of the production game using the statespace diagram in Figure 1 The various areas of these figures can be explained intuitively. For instance, area Ω 1 represents the set of demand realizations such that no firm is capacity-constrained. Similarly, area Ω 3 represents the case in which both firms are capacity-constrained. For area Ω 2 , only firm i is capacity-constrained. Areas Ω 6
and Ω 9 arise when the demand for one product is so high that, when the firms are capacity-constrained, they prefer to manufacture only one product. In areas Ω 4 and Ω 7 , firm i is capacity-constrained while firm j is not, whereas in areas Ω 5 and Ω 8 both firms are capacity-constrained. Moreover, in these last four areas, firm i finds it economical to produce only one product, but firm j produces both products. A mathematical description of the areas follows (we assume A y ≥ βA 3−y , y = 1, 2 to ensure nonnegativity of quantities):
and
In each area, the production game can be solved in closed form (and the SPNE is trivially unique). The first-order KKT conditions are:
where v li are the slack variables (it is easily verified that the objective function is concave so these conditions are also sufficient). For firm j we have similar expressions with the Lagrange multipliers and the slack variables labeled as u j , v lj , l = 1, 2, 3. The expressions for optimal quantities and profits for the various areas of the state-space diagram are obtained by taking appropriate values of the various Lagrange multipliers and the slack variables. Unless specified otherwise, we assume that all quantities are positive and hence the slack variables v li = v lj = 0 for l = 1, 2.
Capacity is not binding (area Ω 1 ) u i = u j = 0 and v 3i, v 3j > 0 by complementary slackness. Solving for quantities we obtain
The quantities are nonnegative as long as A y ≥ A 3−y β. As shown in Figure 3 , this is true as long as we are outside areas Z 1 and Z 2 . The prices are, of course, positive.
Capacity is binding for firm i but not for firm j (area Ω 2 )
It can also be shown that
Capacity is binding for both firms (area Ω 3 )
, y = 1, 2. Figure 3 .
To show that prices are nonnegative is a bit more involved. We show the nonnegativity of prices for β ≥ 0 but if prices are nonnegative for β ≥ 0, then they are nonnegative elsewhere. The prices are nonnegative if 4A y 
We know that
After adding these two inequalities we obtain
Also, we know from the geometry of the state space ( Figure 3 ) that the minimum value of A y (call it A min y ) is obtained from the intersection of lines
. From these two equations we obtain A min
Adding inequalities (3) and (4) , we obtain
since β ≥ 0. This proves the nonnegativity of prices in the two markets in Ω 3 .
Difference in demand intercept realizations is very large with capacity constraint for firm i (areas Ω 4,7 )
We solve in Ω 4 first. Firm i has a capacity constraint and the difference in the demand for the two products is so large that firm i manufactures only one product. Firm j has no capacity constraint and can manufacture both products. The values of various variables for firm i are as follows:
with the corresponding duals being positive. Solving with the above parameters gives us
From this condition we obtain the defining equation for the region as
and A ∈Ω 4,7 where y = 1 for A ∈Ω 4 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω 7 . It is relatively straightforward to see that the quantities and prices are nonnegative.
Firm i manufactures one product and firm j has a capacity constraint (areas Ω 5,8 )
We solve in Ω 5 first. Firm i has a capacity constraint and manufactures only one product whereas firm j, though capacity-constrained, manufactures both products. The values of various variables for firm i are as follows: 
and A ∈Ω 5,8 where y = 1 for A ∈Ω 5 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω 8 . It is easily shown that the quantities are nonnegative (which follows from the boundary equations for these areas). Now P y ≥ 0, if 3A y +
. Adding these two inequalities, we obtain
Next, after adding (6) and
Both firms are capacity-constrained and manufacture one product (areas Ω 6,9 )
We solve in Ω 6 first. Both firms are capacity-constrained and the difference in demands is so high that each manufactures only one product. The values of the parameters for firm i are q f 2i = v 3i = v 1i = 0 and for firm j are q f 2j = v 3j = v 1j = 0, with the corresponding duals being positive. The optimal quantities and prices are b
where A ∈Ω 6,9 with y = 1 for A ∈Ω 6 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω 9 .
. It is straightforward to see that the quantities and the prices are nonnegative.
The optimality conditions in the capacity game
The first-order condition for firm i in the capacity game can be expressed as 3
Differentiating the profit function w.r.t. K f fi in each area and using Leibnitz's rule gives us the first-order condition for firm i:
and similarly for firm j:
In the following proposition, we show the uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium. Proving uniqueness for an asymmetric capacity investment is difficult because one needs to differentiate the first-order conditions, and these are not continuous at the boundaries of the various regions when capacities are asymmetric. Since the boundaries are themselves functions of the capacities of the two firms, differentiating the first-order conditions does not result in tractable expressions. However, we did obtain the optimality conditions above for the capacity game without assuming symmetry. Therefore, all asymmetric equilibria can be found numerically (or in closed form for some probability distributions).
The same comment applies for the pure dedicated subgame analyzed in the next section.
Proposition TA 1 Equilibrium in the capacity game for the pure flexible subgame exists, and the symmetric equilibrium is unique ∀β ∈ (−1, 1) .
Proof. The concavity of the objective functions was demonstrated by Chod and Rudi (2005) , which immediately implies existence of equilibrium. Uniqueness is proven by showing that the slope of the best-response function for each firm is less than one (Cachon and Netessine 2004) . Using implicit differentiation, the absolute value of the slope of the best-response function for, say firm j, is found as
Note that for a symmetric case (c fi = c fj = c f ), Figure 1 simplifies to Figure 2 (which is a special case of Figure 3 for β = 0), and hence areas 4, 5, 7 and 8 disappear. It is easy to check that the integrands in equation (8) are continuous at the boundaries of the areas once we assume symmetry. For instance, the boundary of areas 3 and 6 is
. Evaluating the integrands of Ω 3 and Ω 6 (say, for firm j) at this boundary gives (1/2)
or Ω 6 . Hence, we can safely ignore differentiating the limits of the integrals when we apply Leibnitz's rule as the corresponding terms cancel out.
dF (x 1 , x 2 ).
Clearly,
The same result holds for firm i. Suppose that both firms invest in dedicated technology, i.e., there is a dedicated production line for each product (see Figures 4 and 5) 4 . Note the assumption we make here is that the capacities of firm j are higher than corresponding capacities of firm i. We emphasize that this is not a unique state representation. For instance, the capacity of firm j could be higher than that of firm i in one market but lower in another. We could solve the production game in closed form for any of these scenarios, so the above assumption is for expositional convenience only.
The dedicated subgame
Compared to the pure flexible subgame, the interpretations of the areas in Figure 4 are much simpler.
For instance, area Ω 1 represents no capacity constraint for either firm. In areas Ω 2 and Ω 4 , firm i has capacity constraints for products 1 and 2 respectively, whereas firm j has no capacity constraint for either product. Since in each area the production game can be solved uniquely, the SPNE in the production game is trivially unique. The Lagrangian can be written as:
A similar expression can be obtained for firm j with the Lagrange multipliers u 1j and u 2j . The KKT conditions for firm i are:
where v li , l = 1, 2, 3, 4 are the slack variables. We now provide closed-form solutions for the optimal quantities. All quantities are positive and hence, unless specified otherwise, v li = v lj = 0 for all l.
Capacity is not binding (area Ω 1 ) u li = u lj = 0 for l = 1, 2. The optimal production quantities are
Capacity is binding for one product for firm i (areas Ω 2,4 )
For Ω 2 , u 2i = 0 and u kj = 0 for k = 1, 2. However, since capacity binds for product 1 for firm i, u 1i > 0. The corresponding duals are positive by complementary slackness. Solving for the optimal quantities we obtain
and A ∈Ω 2,4 where y = 1 for A ∈Ω 2 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω 4 .
Capacity is binding for both products for firm i (area Ω 5 )
We have u 1i , u 2i > 0, u 1j = u 2j = 0. Other variables are positive by complementary slackness and production quantities are
Capacity is binding for both firms for the same product (areas Ω 3,7 )
For Ω 3 we have u 1i , u 1j > 0, u 2i = u 2j = 0 and more generally:
and A ∈Ω 3,7 where y = 1 for A ∈Ω 3 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω 7 .
Capacity is binding for one product for firm j and both products for firm i (areas Ω 6,8 )
For Ω 6 we have u 1i , u 2i > 0, u 2j = 0, u 1j > 0. Other variables are nonzero by complementary slackness, and we obtain b
and A ∈Ω 6,8 where y = 1 for A ∈Ω 6 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω 8 .
Capacity is binding for both products for both firms (area Ω 9 )
We have u li , u lj > 0 for l = 1, 2. The optimal solution is simply
The optimality conditions in the capacity game
For firm i, the first-order condition can be expressed as ∂ ³ Eπ d i´/ ∂K d 1i = c i which translates into
Analogously, ∂E ³ π d i´/ ∂K f 2i = c i yields:
For firm j, E ³ ∂π d j /∂K d 1j´= c j translates into:
and finally from E ³ ∂π d j /∂K d 2j´= c j we obtain
In the following proposition we demonstrate the existence and the uniqueness of equilibrium in the capacity game.
Proposition TA 2 Equilibrium in the capacity game for the pure dedicated subgame exists ∀β ∈ (−1, 1) , and the symmetric equilibrium is unique for β ∈ (−1, 1/3 ) .
Proof.
It can be easily verified that each objective function is concave so a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. The Hessian for this game can be written as: (2004), a condition sufficient for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is the diagonal dominance that translates intō
Following Cachon and Netessine
Because of symmetry assumption, we show the analysis for one firm only (say, firm j). We rewrite the first-order conditions (9) for firm j for the symmetric case (note that Figure 4 transforms into Figure 5 and c i = c j = c). These are
We now number the areas with respect to Figure 5 . We again verify that the integrands are continuous along boundaries. To illustrate a specific case, consider areas 2 and 3 in Figure 5 . The boundary
The integrand of Ω 2 in equation (12) reduces to
, which is the same as the integrand of Ω 3 . Hence, we ignore the limits while differentiating using Leibnitz's rule.
Next we derive conditions for (11) to hold. We first show the result for y = 1 :
2βdF (x 1 , x 2 ),
It is easily verified that the inequality holds for each of the areas except for Ω 3 . For the inequality to hold in Ω 3 , we need β < 1/3. The same result for y = 2 can be shown analogously. Suppose that firm i decides to invest in dedicated capacity and firm j decides to invest in flexible capacity. We alter our notation for the purpose of this section only: for clarity we remove the subscripts i and j (subscripts d and f will be used if necessary for the flexible and the dedicated firm). For instance, K m 1 represents dedicated capacity for product 1 and q m 1f represents the quantity of product 1 produced by the flexible firm. As in the previous two cases, a number of areas arise due to the capacity constraints of both firms (see Figure 6 ), 5 and the production game can be solved uniquely for each area.
The mixed subgame
However, this is not a unique representation (i.e., there are other possibilities that could give rise to a different set of areas). Figure 6 is based on the assumption that K m 1 > K m f > K m 2 . For instance, there could be an area 4 similar to area 3 instead of area 12 in the figure. The presence of these areas depends on the assumptions about the capacity levels for the firms. Hence, Figure 6 is only a schematic representation of how the areas are placed with respect to each other. However, because there are multiple representations of the state-space, we suspect that there might be multiple equilibria in the capacity game of the mixed subgame associated with each such representation.
The areas in Figure 6 have intuitive explanations. For instance, in area Ω 1 no firm has a capacity constraint, whereas in area Ω 2 the flexible firm has a capacity constraint. In area Ω 3 , the dedicated firm has a capacity constraint for product 1, etc.
Using the methodology below, we can solve for all possible ways of representing the mixed subgame.
For ease of understanding, some of the areas can be referenced back to Figure 6 . Others (like area Ω 4 ), which do not find representation in Figure 6 , can be understood from the text detailing what they stand for. The Lagrangian formulation for the flexible firm is
The KKT conditions (which, due to the concavity of the objective function, are sufficient) are:
where v lf are the slack variables for l = 1, 2, 3. For the dedicated firm, the Lagrangian is
The KKT conditions for the firm employing dedicated technology are:
where v ld , l = 1, 2, 3, 4 are the slack variables. We proceed by finding the optimal production quantities.
Unless otherwise specified, the quantities are all positive and hence v lf = v ld = 0, l = 1, 2. Similar in spirit to the case of a pure flexible subgame, the Lagrange multipliers often define the boundary conditions for the various areas of integration. For the sake of simplicity, we do not show the values of the Lagrange multipliers whenever they are positive. We do, however, show some interesting cases below in which the slack variables are positive.
Capacity is not binding (area Ω 1 )
Only the flexible firm is capacity-constrained (area Ω 2 )
For the flexible firm, u f > 0. For the dedicated firm, u kd = 0 for k = 1, 2. The optimal production
The flexible firm is not capacity-constrained whereas the dedicated firm is capacityconstrained for both products (area Ω2)
Note that this area is not represented in Figure 6 . Here, u f = 0 and u kd > 0 for k = 1, 2. The optimal production quantities are
The flexible firm is not capacity-constrained whereas the dedicated firm is constrained for product 2 for area Ω 3 and product 1 for area Ω 4
Area Ω 4 is not in Figure 6 . For the flexible firm, u f = 0 with the corresponding duals being nonzero.
For the dedicated firm we have u yd = 0 and u (3−y)d > 0. In what follows, y = 1 for area Ω 3 and y = 2 for area Ω 4 . Solving for quantities we obtain:
Capacity is binding for the flexible firm and for one product for the dedicated firm 
and A ∈Ω 5,6 where y = 1 for A ∈Ω 5 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω 6 .
Capacity is binding for the flexible firm and for one product for the dedicated firm.
The flexible firm manufactures one product (areas Ω 7,8 )
In area Ω 7 the difference in demand realizations is so high that the flexible firm manufactures only product 1. Hence, for the flexible firm, u f > 0 and v 2f > 0 so that b q m 2f = 0. For the dedicated firm, u 1d > 0. Upon solving we obtain v 2f = (1/2)
For β = 0 this reduces to the boundary condition 2A 1 − A 2 > 2K m 1 + 4K m f as is evident in Figure 6 . The optimal quantities are:
and A ∈Ω 7,8 where y = 1 for A ∈Ω 7 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω 8 .
Capacity is binding for the flexible firm and for both products for the dedicated firm.
The flexible firm manufactures one product (areas Ω 9,10 )
The only change from the preceding case is that for the dedicated firm we have u 1d , u 2d > 0. Solving
From here we obtain the boundary condition for these areas as shown in Figure 6 . After solving for the optimal quantities, we obtain:
and A ∈Ω 9,10 where y = 1 for A ∈Ω 9 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω 10 .
Both firms are capacity-constrained (area Ω 11 )
All slack variables are zero for both firms. Solving for quantities we obtain
The flexible firm is capacity-constrained and manufactures one product: product 1 for
area Ω 12 and product 2 for area Ω 13
Area Ω 13 is not in Figure 6 . Let y = 1 for area Ω 12 and y = 2 for area Ω 13 . For the flexible firm,
´> 0, which gives us the boundary condition for this area. The optimal production quantities are:
The optimality conditions in the capacity game
For the flexible firm, the FOC is given by E ³ ∂π m f /∂K m f´= c fj , which translates into:
For the dedicated firm, we have ∂E (π m d ) /∂K m 1 = c i , which translates into 
Proposition TA 3 Equilibrium in the capacity game for the mixed subgame exists for all β ∈ (−1, 1) .
Existence follows from the concavity of the objective functions, which can be easily verified. Uniqueness is analytically difficult to show in this case as there is no symmetry argument that we can invoke.
In fact, we conjecture that for a holdback strategy, the equilibrium in the mixed subgame may not be unique. This follows from the fact that there is more than one way to represent the capacity of the two firms as detailed by Figure 6 .
Conditions sufficient for Assumptions A1 and A2 to hold
We develop appropriate analytical restrictions on the support of the distribution of the demand intercepts so that the Assumptions A-1 and A-2 hold. The lemma below details one such possibility for a special case of symmetric costs in which μ 1 = μ 2 = μ, σ 1 = σ 2 = σ, ρ = 0 and β = 0.
Lemma 1 If there exist A max and A min such that Pr{A ∈ (A min , A max )} = 1 and A max − A min ≤
Let K fu f be the optimal capacity in the deterministic case when A 1 = A 2 = A max . 
